

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSE SOLIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

NELSON, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-00247 DB P

ORDER

Plaintiff is an inmate proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims he received inadequate dental care while incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison. Presently before the court is plaintiff's first amended complaint for screening (ECF No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the court will dismiss the amended complaint and grant plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.

SCREENING

I. Legal Standards

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

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1 granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
2 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

3 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
4 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227–28 (9th
5 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
6 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
7 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
8 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
9 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain
10 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
11 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic
12 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

13 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must
14 contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain
15 factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic,
16 550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the
17 allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.
18 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all
19 doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

20 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

21 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
22 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
23 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .
24 . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
25 or other proper proceeding for redress.

26 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
27 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
28 Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the
meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

II. Allegations in the Amended Complaint

Plaintiff initially brought this action on February 8, 2023,¹ but the court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend because it failed to state a cognizable claim and improperly brought unrelated claims against different defendants in the same action. (ECF No. 7 at 8.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on April 12, 2023. (ECF No. 10.) He has alleged the events giving rise to the claim occurred while he was incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison. (ECF No. 10 at 1.) He names the facility’s dentist, Dr. Nelson, as the sole defendant and accuses Nelson of violating his Eighth Amendment rights.

According to the amended complaint, defendant told plaintiff during a November 2022 dental appointment that he had two cavities that “need[ed] pulling” and that he would need to return to finish cleaning the teeth on the left side of his mouth. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claims “it never happen[ed].” (Id.) He was later “called in” on March 27, 2023 and “all of a sudden” had “[two] filling[s] that were never disclosed.” (Id.)

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¹ Under the prison mailbox rule, a document is deemed served or filed on the date a prisoner signs the document and gives it to prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (establishing the prison mailbox rule); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 105, 1059 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the mailbox rule to both state and federal filings by incarcerated inmates).

III. Does Plaintiff State a § 1983 Claim?

A. Legal Standards – Eighth Amendment

Where a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claims arise in the context of medical care, the prisoner must allege and prove "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). An Eighth Amendment medical claim has two elements: "the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need." McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Thus, a defendant is liable if he knows that plaintiff faces "a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 847. "It is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of harm." Id. at 842.

Delays in providing medical care may manifest deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. To establish a claim of deliberate indifference arising from a delay in providing care, a plaintiff must show that the delay was harmful. See Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994); McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059; Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). In this regard, "[a] prisoner need not show his harm was substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate's claim that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs." Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. In addition, a physician need not fail to treat an inmate altogether in order to violate that inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. Ortiz v. City of Imperial, 884 F.2d 1312, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). A failure to

competently treat a serious medical condition, even if some treatment is prescribed, may constitute deliberate indifference in a particular case. Id.

B. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights by displaying “deliberate indifference for medical needs and negligence” and failing to “disclose mandated information” to him regarding the fillings. (ECF No. 10 at 3.) Plaintiff’s pleadings do not specify whether “medical needs” refers to an extraction of the teeth with cavities, the cleaning of the teeth on the left side of his mouth, or both. Similarly, he pleads “pain and suffering” as an injury, but does not explain whether these teeth have caused him pain, bleeding, infection, or other complications. As such, he has not alleged that the cavities or teeth on the left side of his mouth pose a substantial risk of serious harm. He also does not allege that delaying the extraction or cleaning has caused him harm. See Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[D]elay in providing a prisoner with dental treatment, standing alone, does not constitute an eighth amendment violation.”). Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to plead a cognizable deliberate indifference claim.

Additionally, plaintiff does not plead any facts to support the allegation that defendant placed the fillings without his consent. Plaintiff does not identify who called him in on March 27 or to which office or department he was called. He does not specify whether he received the fillings on March 27, or if someone told him on March 27 that he had two existing fillings for which he does not recall providing consent. Nor does he explain why he believes defendant made the fillings. This claim therefore also fails.

IV. Amending the Complaint

As stated above, plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to plead any cognizable claim. The court will give plaintiff a final opportunity to plead a cognizable claim by granting him leave to file a second amended complaint.

Plaintiff is advised that in an amended complaint he must clearly identify each defendant and the action that defendant took that violated his constitutional rights. The court is not required to review exhibits to determine what plaintiff’s charging allegations are as to each named

1 defendant. The charging allegations must be set forth in the amended complaint, so defendants
2 have fair notice of the claims plaintiff is presenting. That said, plaintiff need not provide every
3 detailed fact in support of his claims. Rather, plaintiff should provide a short, plain statement of
4 each claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

5 Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought
6 in the right place, and plaintiff is entitled to relief if plaintiff's allegations are true. It must
7 contain a request for particular relief. Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who
8 personally participated in a substantial way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right.
9 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation
10 of a constitutional right if he does an act, participates in another's act or omits to perform an act
11 he is legally required to do that causes the alleged deprivation).

12 In an amended complaint, the allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. Fed.
13 R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff may join multiple claims if they are all against a single defendant. Fed.
14 R. Civ. P. 18(a). If plaintiff has more than one claim based upon separate transactions or
15 occurrences, the claims must be set forth in separate paragraphs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).

16 The federal rules contemplate brevity. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d
17 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that "nearly all of the circuits have now disapproved any
18 heightened pleading standard in cases other than those governed by Rule 9(b)"); Fed. R. Civ. P.
19 84; cf. Rule 9(b) (setting forth rare exceptions to simplified pleading). Plaintiff's claims must be
20 set forth in short and plain terms, simply, concisely and directly. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
21 N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) ("Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system,
22 which was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

23 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.
24 E.D. Cal. R. 220. Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, all prior pleadings are superseded.
25 Any amended complaint should contain all of the allegations related to his claim in this action. If
26 plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against the defendant, they must be set forth in the amended
27 complaint.

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By signing an amended complaint, plaintiff certifies he has made reasonable inquiry and has evidentiary support for his allegations, and for violation of this rule the court may impose sanctions sufficient to deter repetition by plaintiff or others. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The amended complaint (ECF No. 10) is dismissed with leave to amend as it fails to state a cognizable claim.
2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "Second Amended Complaint"; failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.
3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint form used in this district.

Dated: May 23, 2023


DEBORAH BARNES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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